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State Sponsors of Terrorism Are Persons Too:
The Flatow Mistake
KEviN TODD SHOOK*
In the wake of the terrorist bombing of the USS Cole, the victimized families
seekjustice and retribution. Just four years ago, Congress may have given them
an avenue for relief. an amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSL4) permitting United States citizens to bring private suits in federal courts
for acts committed outside the United States by nations designated as "state
sponsors of terrorism. " However, the prospect of haling foreign sovereigns into
federal courts for conduct that occurred entirely outside United States borders
raises serious Fifth Amendment Due Process concerns given the traditional
requirement that defendants have minimum contacts with the forum state. In
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the District Court for the District of
Columbia found that foreign states are not "'persons"for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment and are therefore not entitled to the Due Process protection of
minimum contacts.
The author contends that the Flatow court erred. The proper analysis,
according to the author, requires a minimum contacts inquiry that embraces the
principles of "national contacts, " and asserts general jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns who have "systematic and continuous" contacts with the United
States, even though those contacts are unrelated to the claim. Furthermore, the
author notes that the reasonableness prong of the traditional minimum contacts
test permits courts to give significant weight to our social policies against
terrorism. Under this minimum contacts framework, the Amendment remains a
powerful tool against state-sponsored terrorism without violating the time-
honored principles of the United States Constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 1995, a twenty year-old college student from New Jersey named
Alisa Flatow boarded a bus that would travel along the Gaza Strip.1 She was on
her spring break from school, trekking across Israel to celebrate the Passover
holiday.2 Tragically, she never made it to her destination. A terrorist suicide
* I dedicate this note to my parents, Jim and Diana Shook, who are the greatest teachers in
my life. I would also like to thank Charles and Sarah Burk, Steve Shook, and Megan Morris for
their loving support.
1 Terrorism: Victims'Access to Terrorist Assets: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (forthcoming) (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary); News Release, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch Before the Senate Judiciary Committee: "Terrorism: Victims' Access to
Terrorist Assets" (Oct. 27, 1999), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/102799oh.htin (on file
with the Ohio State Law Journal).
2 Id.
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bomber of the Islamic Jihad-a group funded by the Iranian government-
rammed a car loaded with explosives into the bus, killing her and seven others.3
Prior to 1996, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (hereinafter FSIA)
barred lawsuits against foreign state sponsors of terrorism. An American family
seeldng legal damages against a foreign state faced a litany of difficult options;
they could bring a lawsuit in the courts of the foreign state, lobby the United
States to exert political pressure for redress, or ask the United States to bring an
action before the International Court of Justice.4 Recognizing the social and
political difficulties of these options,5  Congress passed an amendment
(hereinafter 1996 Amendment) to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
permitting United States citizens to bring private suits in federal courts for acts
3 1d.
4 Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffrey Atik Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State
Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
87 GEO. L.J. 675, 677 (1999) (listing these three "unhappy" options).
5 International crimes are largely a product of treaties and conventions that define offenses
and establish a legal framework for states to cooperate toward punishment of the perpetrators.
John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission ofInternational Crimes as an Alternative to
Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 3 (1999) (providing a brief introduction to
intemational criminal law). Terrorist bombing was defined as an international crime on
December 15, 1997, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted an 'International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which will enter into force thirty days
after the twenty-second state party has ratified it." Id. at 23.
However, nations rarely attempt to use the International Court of Justice or other relevant
systems of arbitration to challenge violations of international law. See id. at 32-33 (noting that
the Genocide Convention has been in force since 1951, but no efforts were taken to induce
compliance with it until Bosnia-Herzegovina brought an action in 1993 against Yugoslavia
before the International Court of Justice). The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
over a terrorism dispute is unclear. Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at n.15. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that Iran would comply with an order of the International Court of Justice, since the
United States ignored an adverse finding of jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice
with regard to its military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua. Id (citing Nicaragua v.
United States, 1984 I.C.J. 392 and U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by
Nicaragua in the ICJ, DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64 (statement by the U.S. Department of
State, Jan. 18, 1985)).
Similar problems prevent jurisdiction from being established in the international criminal
court. This court was created in treaty form on July 17, 1998, by delegates of the United
Nations in Rome to prosecute the crimes of "aggression," "genocide," "war crimes," and
"crimes against humanity." See Murphy, supra at 9 (providing analysis of these four "core"
crimes, but noting that there may be as many as twenty-four different international crimes). The
most debilitating aspect of the Rome statute is that jurisdiction cannot be obtained without the
consent of the state where the alleged crime took place or the consent of the state of nationality
of the alleged offender. Id. at 21 (discussing the limitations of the Rome statute). The requisite
state consent presents a seemingly insurmountable barrier where the terrorist act is state
sponsored. See id. (noting that the practical effect of this limitation is that only those who
commit international crimes on foreign soil will be subject to jurisdiction of the intemational
criminal court).
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committed outside the United States by nations designated as "state sponsors of
terrorism." 6
Alisa Flatow's father filed a wrongful death action against Iran under these
newly enacted provisions and was granted a $247 million judgment.7 In asserting
personal jurisdiction over Iran, the District Court for the District of Columbia held
that a foreign state is not a person for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause and any "inquiry into personal jurisdiction over a foreign state
need not consider the rubric of 'minimum contacts.' 8 The court hedged its bets
however, and found that even if a foreign state is a person for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment, any state sponsor of terrorism has minimum contacts with the
United States sufficient for federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction.
This note contends that the Flatow court erred in its primary ruling that a
foreign state is not a "person" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and
oversimplified the minimum contacts test it provided in the alternative. Part I will
provide a brief background regarding foreign sovereign immunity and personal
jurisdiction over foreign states. Part II will review the language of the 1996
Amendment and the subsequent case law leading up to Flatow. Part III will
analyze the Flatow holding and show that the text of the Fifth Amendment the
legislative history of the FSIA and 1996 Amendment the FSIA case law, and
6 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 11 1997).
7 Stephen Flatow, Alisa's father, has never actually recovered this amount. See US.
Quashes Attachment by Terrorism Victim Against Iranian Property, 16 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 561, 562 (2000) [hereinafter US. Quashes Attachment] (discussing the father's
difficulties in attaching Iranian property). The 1996 Amendment permits punitive damage
awards and provides victims of state sponsored terrorism with the power to satisfy those
judgments through the attachment of foreign state commercial property in the United States.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). However, none of the plaintiffs filing
under the 1996 Amendment have successfully attached the foreign state property and recovered
their judgment.
The problem is that the FSIA continues to bar execution on currency reserve accounts on
deposit with U.S. financial institutions. Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at 699-703 (discussing
enforcement under the 1996 Amendment). Generally, "countries designated as state sponsors of
terrorism are unlikely to have substantial assets in the United States.' Id. at 699. The only
alternative to attaching property in the United States, is the highly unlikely prospect of
requesting recognition of the judgment in the courts of the foreign state, or by courts in third
party states where the state sponsor of terrorism has substantial assets. Id. (noting the "dim
prospect" of this alternative).
Legislation is currently pending that would amend the FSIA to permit victims of terrorism
to collect foreign assets held in the U.S. See U.S. Quashes Attachment, supra. Although the bill
has bipartisan support, the Clinton Administration is strongly opposed. See id (noting that
Administration officials have called the provisions 'Tundamentally flawed" and "unwise in the
extreme"). As a compromise, the White House has offered to pay part of the Flatows'
judgment, but Mr. Flatow has refused the offer because it would not achieve the goal of
deterring future Iranian sponsored terrorism. See id. (explaining that the judgment might be paid
out of the Justice Department Victim's Rights Fund).
8 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 20 (D.D.C. 1998).
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foreign policy all dictate that Flatow's primary holding be overruled. Part IV will
review alternative approaches to the application of minimum contacts over
foreign state sponsors of terrorism and suggest that general jurisdiction may be
established over a foreign state based upon a "national minimum contacts" model
that places emphasis upon the furtherance of "fundamental substantive social
policies against terrorism."9
II. BACKGROUND: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
"The United States has long afforded foreign sovereigns immunity from suits
in its courts." 10 In 1812, Chief Justice Marshall recognized foreign sovereign
immunity as a principle arising from the "common interest impelling [sovereign
states] to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each
other."11 Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the common law of the
United States provided foreign sovereigns with absolute immunity from lawsuits
in federal courts.12 However, with the growth of international trade and shipping,
the Supreme Court began to rely on the practices of the State Department rather
than principles of international law. 13
On May 19, 1952, the State Department issued the Tate Letter, announcing
that the United States would abandon the theory of absolute immunity, for a
restrictive conception of sovereign immunity that provided courts with limited
authority to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states.14 In 1976, Congress
essentially codified the Tate Letter in the FSIA, thus transferring immunity
decisions from the State Department back to the judiciary.15 The FSIA preserves
foreign state immunity from suit, except for acts falling within one of the statute's
express exceptions.
Section 1330(a) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction... as to any claim... which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity" under the FSIA.16 Section 1330(b) states, "Personal jurisdiction over a
9 See infra Part V.A (suggesting that this factor might be given extra weight when
considering the reasonableness of haling a foreign defendant into court).
10 Joseph M. Terry, Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1029 (1999).
11 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).12 Ethan J. Early, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Is Peace ofMind Enough?, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 203,205 (1999) (providing a
briefhistory of the FSIA).
13 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8-9 (1976) (providing the background of the FSIA).
14 Seeid at8.
15 The judiciary was thought to be better suited for this task, since it is relatively apolitical.
Early, supra note 12, at 206.
16 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994).
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foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts
have jurisdiction under [1330(a) and] where service has been made under section
1608 .... "17 Standing alone, the statute suggests that personal jurisdiction can be
established simply by showing that the defendant falls within one of its express
exceptions to sovereign immunity.18 The statute does not expressly require courts
to determine whether an assertion of jurisdiction under the FSIA comports with
the Constitution.
However, the Fifth Amendment requirement that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, has traditionally placed
additional limits on personal jurisdiction. The Court has said that "due process"
requires that a defendant have "minimum contacts" with the territory of the forum
before it can be subject to personal jurisdiction. 19 The lower courts, beginning
with Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,20 have
almost unanimously found that a foreign state is a person for purposes of the Fiffi
Amendment, and is therefore entitled to this due process protection. 21
The original exceptions under the FSIA are unlikely to conflict with the
"minimum contacts" test. This is because most of the exceptions to sovereign
immunity require that the acts giving rise to the claim either take place in the
United States or have some nexus with the United States.22 For example, the
commercial activities exception to sovereign immunity applies only if the action
is based on: (1) commercial activity in the United States, (2) an act performed in
17 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1994).
18 Prior to the 1996 Amendment, the FSIA contained the following six exceptions: waiver,
cases arising out of commercial activity, rights of property taken in violation of international
law, personal injury and death claims arising in the United States, and actions to enforce
agreements to arbitrate. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1994). The 1996 Amendment created a seventh
exception for claims against state sponsors of terrorism. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)
(Supp. I 1997).
19 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with if).
20 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). Texas Trading was a breach of contract case brought by
several American cement companies against the Republic of Nigeria. The Second Circuit found
that jurisdiction was proper under the commercial activities exception of the FSIA, but also
required "a due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise its authority over a particular
defendant" because the FSIA "cannot create jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it." Id
at 308.
21 Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at 682 ("Until quite recently, the cases uniformly held
that the traditional two-step personal jurisdiction analysis applied to private defendants-
requiring that the statute authorize jurisdiction, and that the exercise of that jurisdiction does not
offend due process-also applies in actions against sovereign defendants under the FSIA.").
22 See Victoria A. Carter, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of Personal
Jurisdiction over Foreign States in US. Courts, 82 VA. L. REV. 357, 363 (1996) (arguing that
the waiver exception was the only pre-1996 exception under the FSIA which did not require a
nexus "between the United States and the acts of the foreign state").
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the United States in connection with commercial activity occurring elsewhere, or
(3) an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with commercial
activity elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the United States.23 Therefore,
actions brought under the commercial activity exception are based on acts
occurring in the United States or having a direct effect on the United States.2
4
In contrast the 1996 Amendment allows federal courts to assert jurisdiction
over foreign states providing financial support to organizations that commit
terrorist acts completely outside the borders of the United States and not
necessarily directed at the United States. Therefore, the long arm reach of the
1996 Amendment may extend farther than the Constitution permits.
I. Tim 1996 TERRORISM EXCEPTION
"On May 25, 1995, Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde introduced
the 'Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995." 25 The bill included provisions
amending the FSIA to allow lawsuits against foreign state sponsors of terrorism.
6
Similar provisions had been introduced in the two previous Congresses, but the
idea had never advanced past the Senate.27
The origins of the legislation dated back several years and were tied to
several tragic events that shocked the world.28 Various anti-terrorist proposals
gained serious momentum after the tragic bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal
23 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988)).
247The other exceptions to sovereign immunity under the FSIA also require some
connection with the United States. For example, the tortious act exception does not apply unless
the foreign state defendant committed the tort in the United States. Similarly, the illegal
expropriations exception requires that "(1) the expropriated property or money exchanged for
the expropriated property be located in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or (2) the expropriating foreign state
agency be engaged in commercial activity in the United States." Id at 364 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3)(1988)).
2 5 H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 37 (1995) (providing the purpose and summary of the Act).
2 6 See id at 36 (providing the language of the Act).
2 7 See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-702 (1994) and HR. REP. No. 102-900 (1992)
(House Reports for the proposed "Exception to Foreign Sovereign Inununity for Certain Cases
Involving Torture or Extrajudicial Killing in a Foreign State").
28 Among those events were: (1) the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland; (2) the kidnapping and murder of Marine Colonel William Higgins by members of
the Hizballah in the Middle East; (3) the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York- and
(4) the arrest of Aldrich Ames, a spy whose treasonous acts almost certainly led to countless
deaths of government operatives. H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 37 (1995).
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Building,29 and the FSIA amendments were eventually enacted as part of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.30
A. The Text of the Terrorism Exception
Under the terms of the exception, sovereign immunity shall not be available
in "any case... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources
for such an act."31 The intended effect of the exception was to eliminate the
defense of foreign sovereign immunity for claims arising from terrorist or
terrorist-sponsored activities.
However, foreign policy concerns raised by the Clinton Administration led to
the inclusion of language that places major limits on the jurisdictional reach of the
Act.32 The 1996 Amendment provides that a court should not hear a case if-
(1) the foreign state, at the time the terrorist act occurred, is not designated by the
Export Administration Act or the Foreign Assistance Act as a terrorist sponsor,
(2) the foreign state is a state sponsor of terrorism, but the. plaintiff made no
attempt to pursue the claim through arbitration, or (3) neither the claimrant nor the
victim was a national of the United States when the terrorist act occurred.33
Foreign states currently designated as sponsors of terrorism include Cuba,
Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.34 Despite these limitations,
several actions have been brought pursuant to the 1996 Amendment.
B. Cases Brought Under the Terrorism Exception
At this time, seven cases have been brought under the 1996 Amendment,
asserting jurisdiction over Cuba,35 Iran,36 Iraq,37 Syria,38 and Libya.39 The courts
29 See id ("With the bombing of the Alfred P. Mun-ah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, on April 19, 1995, the need for this legislation was dramatically and tragically
reinforced.').
30 Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 221 (codifiedin 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610 (Supp. 1111997)).
31 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7) (Supp. M 1997).
32 Leslie McKay, A New Take on Antiterrorism: Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. Rav. 439, 456 (1997) (discussing the limitations of the 1996
Amendment).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A)-(B)(ii) (1998).
3422 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (1999) (listing the countries designated as state sponsors of
terrorism).
35 See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(involving a claim brought against Cuba and the Cuban Air Force for shooting down a United
States civilian aircraft carrying United States citizens traveling on a humanitarian mission).
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faced with these terrorism claims have approached the question of personal
jurisdiction in the following three ways: (1) applying a statutory analysis without
any consideration of constitutional limitations, (2) denying Fifth Amendment
protection to foreign states and rejecting minimum contacts analysis, and
(3) applying a minimum contacts test that places emphasis on "fair notice" or
"fair play and substantial justice."
1. The Statutory Approach: Ignoring Constitutional Limitations
The first case to apply the 1996 Amendment to the FSIA was Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba,4 0 where the government of Cuba authorized MiG 29 pilots to
shoot down two unarmed civilian planes flying over international waters. The
Cuban government did not appear to defend the suit, but sent a diplomatic note
that the federal court had no jurisdiction over Cuba or its political subdivisions. 41
Absent an appearance, the court simply asserted jurisdiction over the Cuban
government without discussing the possibility that Cuba was entitled to due
process rights or whether those rights would be satisfied under minimum contacts
analysis. 42
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia applied a
similar approach in Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran.4 3 In that case, Joseph
Cicippio was assaulted and taken prisoner by members of the lizballah while he
3 6 See Anderson v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000)
(involving Iran's sponsorship of the kidnapping, imprisonment, and torture of Terry Anderson,
an American journalist); Flatow v. Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (involving
Iran's sponsorship of a bombing that took the life of a United States citizen aboard a passenger
bus); Cicippio v. Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (involving an action
brought against Iran for its sponsorship of the assault, torture, and kidnapping of three United
States citizens).
3 7 See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000) (involving claims
arising out of three separate but similar incidents in which Iraq allegedly arrested, detained, and
tortured the plaintiffs while doing business in Kuwait).
38 See In re Estate of Weinstein, 2000 WL 979060 (N.Y. Sur. June 26, 2000) (involving
Syria's alleged sponsorship of a bombing incident that killed a United States citizen in
Jerusalem).
39See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyafi Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (involving Libya's alleged sponsorship of the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103).
40 996 F. Supp. at 1242-47 (stating the facts of the case).
41 Id. at 1242 (discussing the procedural ramifications of Cuba's failure to defend the suit).
42 Id. (stating, without further analysis, that "neither Cuba nor the Cuban Air Force is
immune from the suit?).
43 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
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was overseas serving as comptroller of the American University of Beirut 44
Convinced that Cicippio was a member of the CIA, the captors demanded a
confession-beating him and subjecting him to terrifying interrogation and
torture on a daily basis 45
Cicippio is analogous to Alejandre because the defendant failed to make an
appearance and the court simply asserted personal jurisdiction pursuant to section
1330(b) without any due process analysis. The court found that section 1330(b)
was satisfied because the plaintiff's torture fell within the terrorism exception and
service of process was properly delivered.4 6
Two recent cases have also taken this approach. In Anderson v. The Islamic
Republic ofIran,47 a case involving the kidnapping, imprisonment, and torture of
an American journalist, the District Court for the District of Columbia simply
asserted jurisdiction over Iran without any consideration of whether the court had
personal jurisdiction 8 In In re Estate of Weinstein, the Surrogate Court of New
York, determined that jurisdiction is proper in both state and federal courts, but
based this decision entirely on the 1996 Amendment and the intent of Congress
not to "limit the purpose of the act" which was to provide "a forum in the United
States courts for U.S. citizens who are injured or killed by an act of state
sponsored terrorism."49
These courts avoided some very difficult questions when they decided to
ignore the due process issue. If the courts had engaged in a due process analysis,
they would have been forced to determine whether the foreign state's monetary
support for terrorist operations in other foreign countries constitutes minimum
contacts with the United States.
44 See id at 66. The Hizballah is an Iranian supported terrorist organization dedicated to
diminishing American influence in Lebanon. See id. at 64.
45 Cicippio was held prisoner for 1,908 days. He was forced to play "Russian roulette: A
revolver was placed to his head with a single bullet in the cylinder. Each denial of a CIA
connection produced a pull of the trigger. See id. He was also threatened with castration, beaten
all over his body, and was confined by chains in a rat and scorpion infested cell." See id at 66.
46 See id at 67 (explaining that the service of process delivered through the Embassy of
Switzerland in Tehran was proper and the acts committed against Cicippio satisfied the
following definition of torture:
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain and suffering..., whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information
or a confession, punishing that individual .... or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind.
Idt at n.5.
47 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000).
4 8 See it at 113 (applying a statutory analysis, butno constitutional analysis).
49 In re Estate of Weinstein, 2000 WL 979060, at *2 (N.Y. Sur. June 26,2000).
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2. The Flatow Approach: Denying Fifth Amendment Protection
The question whether a foreign state is entitled to due process protections
requiring minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction was directly confronted in
Flatow v. Islamic Republic oflran,50 and resolved in surprising terms. In Flatow,
the court rejected the Texas Trading mantra51 firmly established in lower court
jurisprudence and found that a foreign state is not a person for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.52
The Flatow court found authority for its decision in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc.,53 where the Supreme Court "assum[ed], without deciding" that a
foreign state is a person for purposes of the Due Process Clause, but cited the
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,54 holding that states of the United States are not
"persons" having due process protections.5 5 The Flatow court argued that the
Weltover footnote was an invitation to revisit the issue, suggesting that a foreign
state might be treated the same way as states of the union.56
3. The Minimum Contacts Approach: Recognizing
Fifth Amendment Protection
The Flatow court "hedged [its] bets"57 on the personal jurisdiction issue, and
applied a minimum contacts analysis just in case a foreign state was entitled to
Fifth Amendment protection. The court found that a nexus will always exist
between the United States and a foreign state brought under the 1996
Amendment, because the language of the Act requires the victim to be a United
50 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
51 See infra Part IV.C.
52 See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 19-21 (holding that a foreign state is not a "person" for the
purposes of constitutional due process analysis).
53 594 U.S. 607,619-20 (1992).
54383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966). In this case, South Carolina challenged the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a law suspending the use of literacy voting
tests that were effectively preventing black citizens from voting. South Carolina argued that the
Act violated due process because it nullified South Carolina's state literacy law without any
court ruling that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court dismissed the claim because it
found that states of the union are not entitled to due process protections because they are not
persons for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
55 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619. Weltover was a breach of contract case brought under the
commercial activities exception to the FSIA. In this case, United States bondholders sued when
Argentina unilaterally extended the time of payment on its bonds. The Supreme Court applied a
minimum contacts analysis before asserting jurisdiction over Argentina "[a]ssuming, without
deciding that a foreign state is a 'person' for purposes of the Due Process Clause." AI
5 6 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 21 (stating, "in Weltover, the Supreme Court hints that this
logic should be extended to interrelationships between states in the international arena").
57 Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at 689.
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States national. Furthermore, the court found that Iran's general diplomatic
contacts with the United States were enough to establish minimum contacts with
the United States.5 8 The court found that "[e]ven in the absence of diplomatic
relations, state actors, as a matter of necessity, have substantial sovereign contact
with each other."59 Lastly, the Flatow court found that "fair play and substantial
justice is well served" by the exercise of jurisdiction over state sponsors of
terrorism.60
Similarly, in Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,61 the
Eastern District of New York applied a minimum contacts analysis placing
emphasis on whether or not the foreign state had "fair notice." Unlike Flatow, the
Rein court fully recognized a foreign state's right to Fifth Amendment protection
under the Texas Trading precedent.
The Rein case arose from the killing of 270 people who were aboard Pan Am
Flight 103-a commercial plane that was bombed while traveling from Frankfurt
to London, New York, and Detroit.62 The court recognized the FSIA provisions
establishing personal jurisdiction where subject matter jurisdiction is coupled with
proper service, but also required that Libya have minimum contacts with the
United States pursuant to due process.63
According to the Rein holding, the relevant inquiry was "whether the effects
of a foreign state's actions upon the United States are sufficient to provide 'fair
warning' such that the foreign state may be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States. '64 The court found that Libya had "fair warning" because
the bombing was "expressly aimed at the United States," and "[a]ny foreign state
would know that the United States has substantial interests in protecting its flag
carriers and its nationals from terrorist activities and should reasonably expect that
if these interests were harmed, it would be subject to ... civil actions in United
States courts. '65
58 See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 21-22 (stating, 'Even if foreign states are invariably
'persons' for the purposes of Constitutional Due Process analysis, Constitutional requirements
have been met in this case.").
59 1d. at23.
60 Id.
61 995 F. Supp. 325,330 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying an abridged minimum contacts test).
62 See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 309
(E.D.N.Y. 1995). Rein was preceded by Smith, a case filed under the same facts prior to the
1996 Amendment to the FSIA. The court dismissed the Smith action for lack of jurisdiction,
finding the facts did not satisfy the exception allowing suits to be filed against foreign states for
personal injury occurring in the United States. See id. at 313; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994). In
so holding, the court refused the invitation to consider the Pan Am airplane territory of the
United States. See Smith, 886 F. Supp. at 313.
63 Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 330.
65 Id
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The District Court of the District of Columbia recently set forth a similar
minimum contacts analysis in Daliberti v. Republic oflrraq,66 a case arising out of
Iraq's hostage-taking of four Americans who were conducting business in
Kuwait.67 Following Flatow, the court noted the serious dangers that such
terrorism poses to all mankind, and found that "[i]n such circumstances,
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' are stretched to the
limits."68 The Daliberti court reasoned that it was not stretching the traditional
minimum contacts analysis too far, because "[a]ll states are on notice that state
sponsorship of terrorism is condemned" and the 1996 Amendment "provides an
express jurisdictional nexus based upon the victim's United States nationality."69
However, unlike Flatow, the Daliberti court was able to identify specific
Iraqi contact with the United States that arose directly out of the claim. The
purpose of the Daliberti hostage-taking "was to prompt certain actions by the
United States, particularly the lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq and the
delivery of millions of dollars worth of humanitarian goods."70 The court found
that the hostage situation had a direct effect on the United States because one of
the plaintiffs was not released until "after such goods were delivered from the
United States."71 Thus, the Daliberti court was dealing with facts that allowed for
a more compelling minimum contacts argument than previous cases. For
instance, in Flatow there was no evidence that the bus bombing was intentionally
directed at United States policy.
Still, the Daliberti court was fully aware that it was stretching,72 and each of
these approaches to minimum contacts remain both unorthodox and-as I will
argue-a bit incomplete.73 Nevertheless, any surprises arising from the cases
applying minimum contacts analysis under the 1996 Amendment are dwarfed by
the Flatow holding that foreign states are not entitled to any Fifth Amendment
protection at all. This argument presents a major challenge to the long line of
cases affording due process protection to foreign states and places serious foreign
policy responsibilities upon the shoulders of the judicial branch.74
66 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
67 See id at 41 (providing the background and facts of the case).
681d. at 54.
6 9 Id. (quoting Flatow, 999 F. Supp. 1, 22-23 (D.D.C. 1998)).
70 d.
71 Id.
72Id.
7 3 See infra Part V.A.
74 The 1996 Amendment may also present a separation of powers issue for the executive
branch. In Dalibert, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the provisions requiring
the Secretary of State to determine which countries constitute state sponsors of terrorism
"impermissibly delegates to an Executive Branch official the power that properly resides in
Congress to set the limits of the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 49.
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IV. THE FLATOWMISTAKE
This note contends that the Flatow court erred in holding that a foreign state
is not a person entitled to due process protection. The analysis suggests that
Flatow should be overruled based upon: (1) the text of the Fifth Amendment and
the legal meaning of "person," (2) the legislative history of the FSIA and the
precursors to the 1996 Amendment (3) the almost unanimous case law finding
that a foreign state is a person for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and
(4) foreign policy considerations.
A. Textual Considerations: The Fifth Amendment Meaning of "Person"
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]operson shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."175 At first blush, it would seem
that the text of the Constitution lends support to the Flatow holding that a foreign
state is not a person. After all, in common usage a "person" is a 'human being; a
man, woman, or child,"76 and a "state" represents "a politically unified people
occupying a definite territory."77 Thus, it would seem that a foreign state is not
really a person, but a collection of persons. However, the term "person" has a
much broader meaning in legal usage-both Congress and the Supreme Court
have supplied definitions of "person" that include many things beyond the scope
of "human being."
1. Corporations and Governmental Bodies Are Persons
First of all, the Supreme Court has found that a corporation is a "person" for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 8 Beginning in 1886, the Supreme Court
has found that "defendant corporations are persons within the intent... of the
Fourteenth Amendment' which forbids a state from denying "any
75 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
76 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICrIONARY 1007 (1991) (stating the definition
of "person").
77 Id at 1305-06 (providing the definition of "state" as referring to aterritory).
78 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). The Fourteenth Amendment extends
the due process limitations placed upon the federal government to state govemments. This
review of the meaning of "person" examines both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments,
given the similar context and meaning of those amendments.
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person... equal protection of the laws."79 Similarly, the Court has extended
double jeopardy protections of the Fiflth Amendment to corporate persons.80
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has found that governmental bodies such as
states are "persons" for purposes of various federal statutes. In Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta,8 1 the Supreme Court held that a municipality
is a "person" within the meaning of the general definitions section82 of the
Sherman Act.83 Similarly, the Supreme Court has found that local governments,
municipal corporations, and school boards are "persons" subject to liability under
the Civil Rights Act, which imposes civil liability on every "person' who
deprives another of his federally protected rights.84 Lastly, in Georgia v. Evans,85
the Court held that the words "any person" in section 7 of the Sherman Act
included states of the union. Although the Supreme Court looked beyond the text
and also considered the intent and history behind these statutory provisions,86
79 Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394,396 (1886) (involving claims brought
against two railroads for the recovery of taxes due). The Court was unanimous on this issue. At
oral argument, Chief Justice Waite said:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of
opinion that it does.
Id. 80 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,568 (1977) (discussing the
double jeopardy protections of the defendant corporation in a criminal contempt action brought
to enforce an antitrust consent decree).
81 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (involving an action to recover treble damages for injuries
sustained by reason of a violation of the antitrust act).82 Section 8 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976), and section 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976), are general definitions sections which define "person" or "persons"
"wherever used in [this Act] ... to include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of
any State, or the laws of any foreign country."
83 See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 396 (1977) (citing
Chattanooga Foundry, 203 U.S. at 390).
84 See Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (finding female
employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New
York were "persons" for purposes of the Civil Rights Act in an action challenging policies
requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before those leaves were
required for medical reasons); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (the Civil Rights Act).
85 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (finding the state of Georgia to be a "person" within the
meaning of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and therefore able to maintain its action for treble
damages for injuries sustained as a result of alleged price fixing and suppression of competition
in sale of asphalt which the state purchased for use in constructing public highways).
86 The Court reasoned that "[n]othing in the [Sherman] Act, its history, or its policy, could
justify so restrictive a construction of the word 'person' in § 7 as to exclude a State." Id.
1314 [Vol. 61:1301
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM
these cases clearly demonstrate that the legal meaning of "person" has come to
include many entities not included in common usage.
2. Distinguishing Katzenbach: States Are Not Persons
The Supreme Court's holding in South Carolina v. Katzenbach87 presents the
greatest hurdle to the contention that a foreign state is a person for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. In that case, the Court found that "States of the Union!' are not
"persons" entitled to due process protection.88 In Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc.,89 the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that aforeign state
is a "person' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, but cited Katzenbach in a
footnote. The Flatow court argued that the Katzenbach footnote was an
"invitation" to revisit the issue, arguing that "[i]f the States of the Union have no
due process rights, then a foreign mission... surely can have none."90
However, the Katzenbach decision is clearly distinguishable from the
question presented in Flatow. First of all, in Katzenbach, South Carolina sought to
invoke Due Process as a plaintiff seeldng to invalidate an act of Congress.91 The
issue in Flatow was whether Iran could invoke Due Process as an unwilling
defendant Second, South Carolina did not invoke Due Process by arguing that
the claim had no nexus or connection with the United States.92 Instead, they
argued that an Act of Congress aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in
voting violated the State's Due Process right to have the question adjudicated in
court.
Not only were the facts and issues different in Katzenbach, but the Court also
rendered its decision with logic that is inapplicable to foreign states. For example,
the Katzenbach court stated that to its knowledge, no court had ever found the
meaning of person under the Fifth Amendment to include states of the union.93
This is certainly not true in the case of foreign states. The overwhelming and
87 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See supra note 54, for a brief description of the facts in
Katzenbach.
88 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 19-21 (D.D.C. 1998) (arguing
that Weltover's citation of the Katzenbach foolnote was grounds for holding that a foreign state
is not a person for purposes of the Due Process Clause).
89 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992). See supra note 55, for the facts presented in Weltover.
90 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 21 (quoting Palestine Info. Office v. Schultz, 674 F. Supp. 910,
919 (D.D.C. 1987)).
91 Carter, supra note 22, at 362 (distinguishing Katzenbach from cases involving waiver
of foreign sovereign immunity).
92Id
93 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (stating that "[t]he word 'person' in the
context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of
interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has
never been done by any coure).
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almost unanimous body of case law in lower courts has established that foreign
states are persons for purposes of the Fifth Amendment 94 Also, Katzenbach
reasoned that a state could not have standing to invoke constitutional rights, as the
parent of its citizens, against the federal government because the federal
government is the ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen.95 This, of
course, is not true for all foreign states. Unlike the states of the United States,
every foreign country is the ultimate parent of its own citizens and should be
permitted to invoke constitutional rights on their behalf.
3. The Fifth Amendment "Person " Includes Foreign Entities
Significantly, the Supreme Court has already found that due process rights
are not necessarily domestic. The "person" referred to in the Due Process Clause
includes foreign corporations and individuals that are not American citizens. In
Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of
California,96 the Supreme Court held that the "Equal Protection Clause imposes
limits upon a [s]tate's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do
business within its borders. 9 7 Furthermore, in United States v. Pink,98 the
Supreme Court explicitly found that aliens, as well as citizens, are entitled to the
due process protections of the Fifth Amendment. A logical extension of this
holding is that foreign states, like foreign corporations, are persons entitled to due
process protection.
Thus, the Supreme Court should find that a foreign state is a "person" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. The Court has already found that various
governmental bodies, both foreign and domestic, can fall within the legal
meaning of person. The Katzenbach holding, that states of the union are not
persons, is clearly distinguishable and inapplicable to the question regarding
foreign states. For these reasons, Congress has never doubted the applicability of
the Fifth Amendment to foreign states.
94 See infra Part IV(B).
95 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
96 451 U.S. 648 (1981) (finding that a state cannot impose more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than it imposes on domestic corporations).
97 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 875 (1985) (explaining holding
in Western and Southern, 451 U.S. at 667).
98 315 U.S. 203, 226-28 (1942). The Pink case involved the disposition of funds of the
New York branch of a Russian insurance company, after the Russian Government nationalized
the business of insurance and cancelled the rights of shareholders to recover insurance money
they were owed. The Supreme Court found that creditors of the Russian company, who were
not citizens of the United States, were entitled to Fifth Amendment protection.
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A. Legislative Assumptions: Foreign States Have Due Process Rights
The legislative history of both the FSIA and the earliest versions of the 1996
Amendment clearly indicate that Congress intended the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to foreign states. Committee reports of both acts indicate
that it was the purpose of Congress to craft legislation that asserted jurisdiction
only over those foreign states that had minimum contacts with the United
States.99
The House Committee Report for the FSIA provides clear guidance on this
issue, stating that section 1330(b) of the FSIA "provides, in effect, a federal long-
arm statute over foreign states" patterned after the District of Columbia long-arm
statute.100 The Report states under no uncertain terms that "[t]he requirements of
minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice are embodied in
[1330(b)]."' 01 Clearly, the drafters of the FSIA believed the Fifth Amendment
applied to foreign states, and the due process minimum contacts test placed
additional limitations on a federal court's power to assert jurisdiction in
international litigation.
The 1996 Amendment to the FSIA was part of a much larger terrorism
package passed in the wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing.'0 2 This may explain
why the legislative history regarding Fifth Amendment limitations of the 1996
99 This is true, even though the provisions of the FSIA and the 1996 Amendment do not
expressly mention Due Process or minimum contacts. The language of section 1330(b) of the
FSIA allows federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states where there is:
(1) subject matter jurisdiction under section 1330(a); and (2) proper service of process pursuant
to section 1608 of the Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(b), 1608 (Supp. I1 1997).
10 0 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6612.
101 Id The reports continues:
Significantly, each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections 1605-1607, requires
some connection between the lawsuit and the United States, or an express or implied waiver by
the foreign state of its immunity from jurisdiction. These immunity provisions, therefore,
prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before our courts can exercise personal
jurisdiction.
Id.
The drafters were probably correct in their view that any foreign state that satisfied the
elements of the original FSIA exceptions, also satisfied minimum contacts. However, the
elements of the 1996 Amendment do not require the same kind of nexus with the United States.
See supra notes 22-24, and accompanying text
102 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 also created new terrorist
offenses, increased penalties for terrorism-related crimes, devised new investigative tools to
uncover terrorism, set prohibitions against expansion of nuclear materials, clarified immigration
laws, and fimded various anti-terrorism programs, research and development See
H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 1-4 (1996).
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Amendment is virtually nonexistent.103 Nevertheless, the House Reports of two
earlier versions104 of the 1996 Amendment make it very clear that the amendment
would assert personal jurisdiction, "subject to the Due Process Clause's
requirement of 'minimum contacts."'
Thus, the drafters of both the FSIA and the earliest versions of the 1996
Amendment believed that the legislation embraced the principles of minimum
contacts. Without a doubt, Congress never intended for the FSIA to permit courts
to assert jurisdiction over foreign states that do not have minimum contacts with
the United States.
B. The Case Law Extending Due Process Rights to Foreign States
"If there is any reason to doubt that foreign sovereigns are protected by the
Due Process Clause, it does not arise from the case law under the FSIA. ' 10 5 To
date, the Supreme Court has only "assum[ed], without deciding that a foreign
state is a person for purposes of the due process clause."10 6 Nevertheless, the
lower federal courts have almost unanimously found that a foreign state is entitled
to Due Process protections requiring they have minimum contacts.
The principal case discussing personal jurisdiction over a foreign state is
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,1 0 7 decided just
five years after the FSIA was enacted into law.10 8 In that case, the Republic of
Nigeria, "developing at breakneck speed..., contracted to buy huge quantities of
103 But see Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at 685-87 (arguing that the absence of any
legislative history challenging the constitutionality of the Act suggests that Congress did not
believe the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign state involved constitutional
considerations). The problem with this view is that the Judiciary Committee addressed
constitutional concerns in previous versions of the bill. See supra note 101 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, the fact that the legislative dogs weren't barking, may only suggest that they
were asleep or in a very big hurry to respond to the tragedy in Oklahoma City.
10 4 H.R. REP. No. 102-900, at 1-2 (1992); H.R. REP. No. 103-702, at 1-2 (1994). The
provisions of the earlier exceptions are virtually identical to the 1996 Amendment. However,
the 1992 version only asserts jurisdiction over foreign states supporting acts of "torture" and
"extrajudicial killing," whereas the 1994 version adds cases of "genocide" and the 1996
Amendment adds cases of "aircraft sabotage!' and "hostage taking." Also, the earlier versions
are broader because they do not include the requirement that the foreign state be designated as a
"state sponsor of terrorism" under the Export Administration Act.
10 5 Glarmon & Atik, supra note 4, at 682.
106 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992). In a footnote, the
Court cited South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,323-24 (1966), which held that states
of the union are not persons for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Id Some have suggested
that the footnote casts doubt on a foreign state's right to due process. See Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 19 (D.D.C. 1998), and Glannon & Atik, supra note 4.
107 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
108 See Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at 682 (reviewing the case law applying due
process analysis to FSIA cases and arguing Texas Trading should be abandoned).
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Portland cement" but later repudiated those contracts when its docks became so
clogged with ships that all exports and imports ground to a halt.109 The American
cement companies sued for breach of contract and the Republic of Nigeria argued
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. 110 The Second Circuit found that the
FSIA "cannot create personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it
Accordingly, each finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires, in
addition, a due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise its authority over
a particular defendant."111
The Texas Trading decision has become the standard authority for the
proposition that a foreign state is a person for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.112 As a result courts confronted with FSIA cases have routinely
cited the Texas Trading mantra and applied the traditional minimum contacts
test1 13 The Texas Trading view has become so ingrained in jurisprudence that it
is cited as authoritative in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.114 Clearly,
the lower courts have left their mark with consistent opinions of learned judges.
C. The Foreign Policy Implications of Flatow
Perhaps the strongest criticism of Flatow is not based in legal analysis, but in
foreign policy. After all, the United States' interest in foreign relations, treaty
obligations, and diplomacy with Iran, must outweigh Flatow's interest in an
unsatisfied 1 5 $250 million judgment. 16 The Flatow holding that a state sponsor
109 Tea. Trading, 647 F.2d at 302 (2d Cir. 1981).
110 Id.
I It at 308.
112 See Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at 682-84 ("Cases routinely state this proposition
as accepted fact with a ritual citation to Texas Trading").
113 See, e.g., Vermeulen v. Renault, U.SA., Inc., 985 F2d 1534, 1553 (11th Cir. 1993);
Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989); WMW Mach., Inc. v.
Werkzeugmaschinenhandel GmbH IM Aufbau, 960 F. Supp 734, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Comm. of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375,
1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
1 14 RESTATEMENT (rHRD) OF FOREIGN RELAnONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 453 cmt. c (1987).
The exercise of jurisdiction by courts in the United States is subject to the due process
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Due process requires that for a
state to adjudicate claims against a defendant, the defendant must have at least a minimum
of contacts with the state.
Id., quoted in Glannon & Atik, supra note 4, at 684.
1 15 See US. Quashes Attachment, supra note 7.
1 16 See Early, supra note 12, at 234-35 (arguing that the balance of interests in the Flatow
case must be viewed in a practical light, giving substantial consideration to the United States
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of terrorism can be haled into an American court-without affording the foreign
state the same protections provided to American citizens-could have serious
effects on delicate United States diplomatic relationships. The foreign policy
issues at stake include the legitimacy of the FSIA, possible retaliation and
reciprocation against the U.S. in foreign courts, and unwarranted judicial
involvement in foreign affairs.
First of all, the Flatow holding threatens the legitimacy of the FSIA. Of the
four cases brought under the 1996 Amendment none of the defendants entered an
appearance, and only Libya filed a reply brief.117 Flatow's refusal to extend due
process rights to foreign states only lends support to theories of absolute
immunity. Furthermore, Flatow only adds fuel to arguments that a foreign state
will not get a fair trial in the United States.
These concerns for legitimacy of the FSIA were raised by a representative of
the Department of State during committee hearings for the 1996 Amendment
The representative called upon the committee not to "expand our jurisdiction in
ways that cause other states to question our statute."'1 18 The representative further
argued that over-expansion of jurisdiction "could undermine the broad
participation we seek. It could also diminish our ability to influence other
countries to abandon the theory of absolute immunity and adopt the restrictive
view of sovereign immunity, which the United States has followed for over forty
years."" 9
The concern that disparate treatment between American citizens and foreign
states in federal courts might weaken the legitimacy of the FSIA results in a
second concern: reciprocal treatment of the United States in foreign courts. The
United States commitment to a restrictive theory of immunity means that in
certain situations, it is subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. These courts
could use Flatow to justify different standards for the United States than other
interest in diplomacy and the unlikelihood that the Flatow family will ever recover their
judgment from Iran).
117 See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("Cuba
has presented no defense... ."); Cicippio v. Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64
(D.D.C. 1998) ("Iran was served with process on April 28, 1997, but did not respond to the
complaint... ."); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1998)
("Defendants have not entered an appearance in this matter."); Rein v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325,328 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining the arguments
set forth in Libya's reply brief and noting that "[t]he individual defendants have not been served
with the Complaints in these actions and have not entered appearances").
A foreign sovereign's decision not to enter an appearance does not result in an immediate
default judgment. The plaintiff must still establish "his claim or right to relief by evidence that
is satisfactory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994).
118 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 12
(1994) (statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State).
1191d
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defendants who come before it. If the United States wishes to promote the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and fair and just resolutions of
international disputes, then it should lead by example.
Furthermore, the prospect of asserting jurisdiction over a state sponsor of
terrorism presents the obvious danger of the judicial branch becoming
unnecessarily involved in the United States' most delicate foreign relationships.
The Department of State criticism of the 1996 Amendment included particular
concern "over the prospect of nuisance or harassment suits brought by political
opponents or for publicity purposes, where... foreign governments or officials
who are not torturers... will be required to defend against expensive and drawn-
out legal proceedings.' 120 The State Department official contended that such suits
would create "significant problems for the Executive's management of foreign
policy."121
Although the Clinton administration's concern that numerous frivolous suits
might be filed has not been the reality, it is certainly true that diplomatic
negotiations can be undermined when American courts assert jurisdiction over a
foreign state for alleged acts of terrorism. For example, a case asserting
jurisdiction over Syria might be enough to destroy the United States' central
position in Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations.
These difficulties are only heightened when jurisdiction is established over a
foreign state for activity so remote that it would not even satisfy the minimum
contacts test. On the other hand, if the facts of a case clearly satisfy minimum
contacts, then due process protections have cost American plaintiffs nothing and
provided an aura of legitimacy and fairness that can reassure the foreign state
defendant and its neighbors.
120 The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing on S. 1629 Before the Subcomm. On
Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 28 (1990)
(statement of David P. Stewart, Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refugee
Affairs, Department of State).
121 Id. at 20. Stevart concluded:
This is especially troubling because... in order to meet the statutory requirements,
plaintiffi will have to allege as a preliminary matter that the conduct in question took place
under the authority of the foreign govemment or under color of its law. In every case, therefore,
the "lawfulness" of foreign govemment policies or sanctions will be an issue. We believe that
inquiry by a U.S. court into the legitimacy of foreign government sanctions is likely to be
viewed as highly intrusive and offensive.
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V. THE MINIMUM CONTACTS OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM
Armed with due process rights, a foreign state is only subject to personal
jurisdiction where it has minimum contacts with the forum. 122 Applying the
minimum contacts analysis does not present an insurmountable barrier to
plaintiffs, but simply assures the fairness and legitimacy of the claim. This note
advocates a due process framework in which: (1) fundamental social policies
against terrorism are given significant weight in examining reasonableness, (2) a
national minimum contacts analysis is applied, and (3) jurisdiction can be asserted
based on a foreign state's "systematic and continuous" contacts that are unrelated
to the claim.
Minimum contacts must be sufficient such that the "maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."12 3 The
Supreme Court has clarified that this standard is met only where (1) the defendant
has purposefully availed itself of the forum, and (2) it is "reasonable" to exercise
jurisdiction.124 The Court has rejected a "mechanical" approach to personal
122 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Before International Shoe,
personal jurisdiction could not be established without the defendant's presence in the forum
state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (requiring presence). The International
Shoe standard allowing courts to assert personal jurisdiction based upon the defendant's
contacts with the forum state is critical to the 1996 Amendment since a foreign state could not
possibly be present within a United States jurisdiction.
International Shoe involved an action brought by and in the State of Washington for the
recovery of unpaid contributions to a state unemployment fund. See 326 U.S. at 311. The
defendant-a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri-
manufactured and sold shoes throughout the United States. Id at 313. Although the defendant
neither maintained offices nor executed contracts for the sale of shoes in Washington, it did
employ eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided and performed their principal activities for the
company in Washington. See id
The Court required the defendant have minimum contacts to satisfy the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, but has subsequently found that Fifth Amendment due
process also requires application of the minimum contacts test. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (implying that the Fifth Amendment imposes a
contacts requirement); Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying a minimum contacts analysis pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment).
123 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
124 See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-78 (1985). The Supreme Court
found that Florida could exert personal jurisdiction over Michigan owners of a Burger King
franchise where their efforts were "purposefully directed" toward Burger King's Miami
headquarters and the defendant failed to demonstrate how jurisdiction in that forum was
fundamentally unfair. See id at 476.
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jurisdiction125 and applied these rules subjectively, viewing the specific fact
patterns of each suit and making case by case deterninations.
126
In determining whether an assertion of jurisdiction is 'reasonable," the Court
is primarily concerned with the burdens placed upon the defendant. 127 This is
especially true in the case of foreign defendants, where "[tihe unique burdens
placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long ann of
personal jurisdiction over national borders." 128 Nevertheless, the burden on the
defendant is considered in light of the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
the plaintiffis interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and interests in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.129
There has been considerable disagreement about the kind of contacts a
foreign state must have before being haled into a United States court. The
Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
of California,130 coupled with only a cursory minimum contact analysis in
125 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ("[Tjhe criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do
not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."). The Court abandoned the traditional black
and white standard that required the defendant's presence within the territorial boundaries of the
forum state, see Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722, (holding that jurisdiction is proper where a defendant
has minimum contacts with the forum); see also Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
126 The abandonment of this strict rule meant that the court would make specific fact
inquiries. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 484-85 (considering the business acumen of the
defendants and the fact that they did not act under economic duress).
127 See World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) ("Implicit
in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while
always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant
factors.').
12 8 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, at 114 (1987). Asahi
demonstrates the Court's sensitivity to international contacts in cases where the interests of the
United States are thin. The United States plaintiff in this case settled its dispute, and the only
remaining parties were two foreign defendants. As a result, the interest to the United States was
slight and the burden on the defendant was great See id The court stated:
[T]he burden on the defendant in this case [was] severe. Asahi [was] commanded by the
Supreme Court of California not only to traverse the distance between Asahi's headquarters in
Japan and the Superior Court of California in and for the County of Solano, but also to submit
its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign nation's judicial system.
Id
129 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
130 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The Asahi Court failed to reach a majority on the meaning of
purposeful availment. Justices Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia found that placement
of a product in the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed at the forum state. Id at 112. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
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Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,131 has left federal courts with little
guidance on this issue.132
The Flatow opinion demonstrates this confusion. The court found that even if
it were required to perform a minimum contacts analysis, the test would be
satisfied for all foreign states sponsoring terrorist activities that cause death or
personal injury to United States citizens. 133 The court reached this conclusion
based primarily upon consideration of "fair play and substantial justice,"' 34 but
only briefly mentioned notions of general jurisdiction and national contacts.135
Given the Supreme Court's rejection of a "mechanical" test and subsequent
case by case approach, 136 it seems unlikely that it would follow Flatow's blanket
Blackmun found that a defendant purposefully avails himself where he is aware that his product
will reach the forum state through the stream of commerce. Id. at 117. Significantly, the Court
was almost unanimous (8-1) in holding that assertion of jurisdiction in this case would be
unreasonable.
131 504 U.S. 607 (1992). Without further analysis, the Weltover Court simply stated that
"Argentina possessed 'minimum contacts' that would satisfy the constitutional test. By issuing
negotiable debt instruments denominated in United States dollars and payable in New York and
by appointing a financial agent in that city, Argentina 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the [United States]."' Id. at 619-20. The Court did not
explain whether the contacts in New York would justify personal jurisdiction of courts outside
of New York, or whether it was necessary that Argentina's contacts relate to the claim.
132 See generally Sean K. Hombeck, Comment, Transnational Litigation and Personal
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1389 (1996). The author notes that:
The degree of complexity inherent injurisdictional analysis has grown so severe that it has
become a source of great jocularity. Without a majority opinion, lower courts are left without
precedent in determining when jurisdiction based on contacts analysis is consonant with the
Constitution of the United States. Currently, foreign defendants continue to argue in favor of
Asahi's analysis, while United States plaintiffs continue to offer jurisdictional arguments in
accordance with World-Wide.
Id. at 1393-94.
133 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 23 (D.D.C. 1998) ("As
terrorism has achieved the status of almost universal condemnation .... this court concludes
that fair play and substantial justice is well served by the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
state sponsors of terrorism which cause personal injury or death of United States nationals").
134 The Flatow court properly placed emphasis on "fair play and substantial justice" based
on the Supreme Court opinion that "reasonableness considerations sometimes serve to establish
the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would
otherwise be required." Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 22 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 483-84 (1985)). However, Burger King's emphasis on reasonableness did not
eliminate the requirement of purposeful availment and minimum contacts. Instead, the Court
also looked at "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms
of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing" to determine "whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479.
135 See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 22 ("Sovereign contacts, therefore, should be sufficient to
sustain general jurisdiction over Defendants ...'9.
136 See supra notes 112-13.
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rule that all state sponsors of terrorism will satisfy minimum contacts analysis.
Instead, the best approach would take the specific facts of each case and consider
not only the reasonableness of jurisdiction, but also consider the nature and
quantity of the sovereign's national contacts with an eye toward establishing
general jurisdiction in the United States.
A. Reasonableness and Fundamental Social Policy Against Terrorism
Applying the reasonableness prong to cases brought under the 1996
Amendment will invariably involve resolution of the conflict between the burden
on the defendant on one side and the interests of the plaintiff and the United States
on the other.137 To satisfy "reasonableness," the court will have to find that the
plaintiff's interest in relief, coupled with the United States' interest in furthering
fundamental social policies against terrorism, outweighs the defendant's burden
to litigate in a distant land under foreign law.138 The inquiry is important because
in some cases, a high level of "reasonableness" will diminish the requirement of
minimum contacts.
13 9
The Flatow court correctly noted that due process is not a technical
conception, but a flexible framework within which "[e]ach case requires
evaluation in light of its own unique facts and circumstances, in order to ensure
that the exercise of jurisdiction complies with 'fair play and substantial
justice.""'140 Surprisingly, the court follows this declaration with a blanket rule
that "fair play and substantial justice is well served by the exercise ofjurisdiction
over foreign state sponsors of terrorism which cause personal injury to or death of
United States nationals."141 The Flatow court reasoned that all state sponsors of
terrorism would satisfy minimum contacts because "[a]ll states are on notice that
state sponsorship of terrorism is condemned by the international community," and
no foreign sovereign could reasonably believe that "the United States would not
respond to [an] attack on its citizens."142
While the Flatow logic espouses undeniable truths, the analysis seems
incomplete, especially given the Supreme Court's strong sensitivity to haling
foreign defendants into United States courts.143 The problem with the analysis is
that it lacks any reference to the burden on the defendant, which is normally the
primary inquiry of the reasonableness prong.144 Clearly, in all cases brought
137 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
138 See ia
139 See supra note 122.
14 0 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 22.
141 Id. at23.
142 
ad
143 See supra note 114.
144 See World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,292 (1980).
2000] 1325
6OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
under the 1996 Amendment the burden on the defendant will be great. In each
case, the foreign state is burdened by its distance from the United States, the
unfamiliarity with United States law, and the FSIA designation that it is a sponsor
of terrorism.145 Thus, a court seeking to establish jurisdiction over a foreign state
sponsor of terrorism should set forth a litany of interests that overwhelms the
defendant's burden.
In Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,146 the Eastern District
Court of New York fleshed out some of these interests. 147 The Rein court found
that the bombing of Flight 103 "had extensive impacts on the United States"
including the deaths of "189 United States nationals," the imposition of
"significant security concerns for the United States and its aviation industry," and
"harm to United States businesses and the domestic economy through... a
decline in passenger travel and increases in operating, insurance and potential
liability costs. ' 148 The court seemed to imply that these interests outweighed any
burden on the foreign state defendant. 149
The interests of the United States may arise from general substantive social
policies against terrorism, but the court must show how the facts place those
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the
defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of
other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not
adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the forun, the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Id. (citations omitted). See also supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
145 In Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325
(E.D.N.Y. 1998), Libya argued that the FSIA violates due process because it labels Libya a
"state sponsor of terrorism" without a trial. The court found that the state sponsor of terrorism
designation did not violate due process because it establishes nothing more than an exception to
the FSIA. According to the court:
The designation in no way affects the merits of the underlying claims or liability of foreign
states against whom actions may be maintained. Having determined that it has jurisdiction in
this nonjury action, this Court would put the FSIA aside and determine the merits of the action
as an entirely separate matter. Furthermore, the FSIA in no way alters the fact that plaintiffs
have the burden of proving that Libya was responsible for the acts alleged.
Id at 330.
146 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
147 This is the only case, other than Flatow, where a court performed a minimum contacts
analysis pursuant to the 1996 Amendment. See supra Part II.B (reviewing the four cases
brought under the 1996 Amendment).
148 Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 330.
149 See id ("Any foreign state would know... that if these interests were harmed, it
would be subject to a variety of potential responses, including civil actions in United States
courts").
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substantive social policies at risk 1 50 Arguably, this was a much more difficult
task in Flatow than it was in Rein. The bomb in Rein killed 189 United States
citizens, on a United States commercial airplane, that was in route to the United
States. 151 The bomb in Flatow killed one United States citizen, aboard a foreign
bus, traveling along the Gaza Strip. The Rein bombing provides a stronger case
for emphasizing United States interests, because it seems to be more directly
targeted at the United States.
Nevertheless, the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction in Flatow
and cases similar to Flatow is not doomed. In reviewing cases brought under the
1996 Amendment, the court should place substantial weight upon the interest in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies against terrorism. The
plaintiff's argument must be that the United States has an overwhelming social
interest in protecting its citizens from terrorist attack wherever they travel, and
demonstrate how the facts place that interest at risk. The Rein and Flatow courts
found that this interest alone was enough to satisfy the reasonableness
requirement. 152 Once a court establishes the "reasonableness" of jurisdiction, it
must then show that the requirement of purposeful minimum contacts is
satisfied.153
B. The National Minimum Contacts Test
Federal courts faced with claims against state sponsors of terrorism must
determine the relevant geographical area for purposes of delineating the minimum
contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction. In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic ofNigeria,154 the Second Circuit held that the area with which
the defendants must have minimum contacts was the entire United States, not
merely the state of New York where the action was pending.155 However, the
Texas Trading court found that the Republic of Nigeria had minimum contacts in
15 0 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
151 McKay, supra note 32 at 440 (reciting the facts and background of the Pan Am 103
tragedy).
152 See Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 330; Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 22-
23 (D.D.C. 1998).
153 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (setting forth the two-prong Burger King
test). The argument that minimum contacts is not necessary where the reasonable requirement
has been satisfied, was set forth by a minority of the Court in Asahi. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 121 (1987). Justices Stevens, White and Blackmun did not
join Part II-A of the opinion because they believed that the Court's holding that the State's
exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner would be unreasonable and unfair alone required
reversal, and rendered any examination of minimum contacts unnecessary. See i
154 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
155 David Todd Pendergast, Strangers in a Strange Land: Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1159, 1171 (1990)
(discussing the minimum contacts test).
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New York through its correspondent bank, and was not faced with a situation
where the foreign state contacts were entirely outside of the federal district's
jurisdiction.156
Nevertheless, many courts have followed the Texas Trading "national
minimum contacts" model and asserted jurisdiction over foreign defendants
where there were no relevant contacts with the forum state. For example, in
Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television,157 the Eleventh Circuit
found Iran's contacts with New York to be sufficient to assert personal
jurisdiction in a Florida district court. Similarly, in Banker's Trust Co. v.
Worldwide Transportation Services, Inc., 158 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas found that a foreign defendant's extensive
economic activity in the United States as a whole satisfied the minimum contacts
analysis sufficient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in Arkansas. 159
Many lower courts have justified the national minimum contacts test based
on statutes that provide for "nationwide" and "worldwide" service of process.160
For example, in Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Electric Co.,161 the Ninth Circuit indicated
that national contacts analysis is appropriate when a statute authorizes nationwide
service of process. 162 Commentators supporting this view argue that "if Congress
can authorize personal jurisdiction over persons anywhere in the United States, it
can also authorize personal jurisdiction based on contacts of foreign defendants
with the entire United States. 1 63
The Flatow court briefly referred to national contacts based upon this kind of
statutory argument. The court noted that the case was brought against Iran for
actions in its sovereign capacity. Because the case was brought in this way, and
because "commercial actions under the FSIA embrace the concept of nationwide
contacts," the court reasoned that "[s]overeign contacts... should be
sufficient."164
156Id.
157 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982). "In Harris, an American manufacturer brought suit
against Iranian defendants seeking judgement declaring the supply contract between the parties
to have been terminated by force majeure as a result of the Iranian revolution and the
subsequent crisis created when Iranian militants seized hostages at the United States Embassy."
Pendergast, supra note 155, at 1172.
158 537 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
159 See Pendergast, supra note 155, at 1173 (analyzing cases applying a national
minimum contacts test).160 See Hombeck, supra note 132, at 1433-34.
161 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989). Go-Video sued several foreign manufacturers for
conspiring to prevent the marketing of a dual deck VCR it had patented in the United States. Id.
162Id. at 1414-15.
163 Hombeck, supra note 132, at 1434 (citing GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESrIN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITGATION IN UNITED STATES CouRTS 106 (2d ed. 1992)).
164 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 22 (D.D.C. 1998).
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However, not all courts have followed this broad interpretation. 165 Some
commentators criticize this approach because it allows defendants to shop for the
forum that is most advantageous to their claim.166 This criticism is probably not
applicable to cases involving terrorism, since the substantive tort laws of different
states would likely not vary dramatically enough to alter a finding of tortious
terrorist support.
Many plaintiffs with claims against state sponsors of terrorism would benefit
from a national minimum contact model. The recent bombing of the USS Cole in
Aden, Yemen provides an excellent example. Although the terrorists behind the
Yemen massacre currently remain unknown, it is widely accepted that the
bombing was targeted against the entire United States. Thus, under a national
minimum contacts theory, a family member could bring an action against a state
sponsor of terrorism in any federal jurisdiction of the United States based upon
the theory that the bombing constitutes contacts with the entire United States.
Similarly, under this approach a plaintiff could assert jurisdiction over a foreign
state defendant in Kansas, based on the foreign state's contacts with New York
City or Washington, D.C. Lastly, the national contacts approach serves as a
means of collecting a greater number of contacts, which is essential in
establishing the "systematic and continuous contacts" necessary for the assertion
of general jurisdiction.
C. General Jurisdiction: Using Contacts Unrelated to the Claim
The Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of jurisdiction for foreign
defendants: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Unlike specific
jurisdiction, a court may assert general jurisdiction based upon contacts with the
forum that are entirely unrelated to the claim.167 However, the "exercise of
general jurisdiction requires a higher minimum contacts threshold than specific
165 See Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 542 F. Supp. 33,34 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the Dominican Republic because it lacked minimum contacts with
the Northern District of California); Olsen by Sheldon v. Gov't of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641,648-
51 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring minimum contacts with the forum state of California, but not
expressly rejecting Texas Trading).
166 See Pendergast, supra note 155, at 1176.
167 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, SA. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414-15 (1984).
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's
activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation
to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the
foreign corporation.
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jurisdiction."' 68 A federal court may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant
only where the contacts with the forum are systematic and continuous.1 69
The Supreme Court has asserted general jurisdiction based on minimum
contacts only twice, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,1 70 and in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall.1 7 1 The Court found general
jurisdiction proper in Perkins, but not in Helicopteros.1 72 In both cases, the
Court's decision rested upon the nature and extent of the foreign defendant's
contacts with the forum.
In determining whether a foreign defendant's contacts are systematic and
continuous, federal courts have relied upon the following four factors:
(1) the extent to which the defendant availed themselves of the privileges of
American law, (2) the extent to which litigation in the United States would be
foreseeable to them, (3) the inconvenience to defendants in litigating in the United
States, and (4) the countervailing interest of the United States in hearing the suit 173
These factors bear considerable resemblance to those applied in the
reasonableness prong. Thus, where the interest of the United States is great, and
the foreign state has availed itself to the extent that litigation in the United States
is foreseeable, the contacts with the United States need not relate to the claim.
The principle of general jurisdiction is important to the 1996 Amendment.
For example, the Flatow case involved the bombing of a passenger bus that was
traveling along the Gaza Strip.174 Although the incident resulted in the death of a
168 Bret A. Sumner, Due Process and True Conflicts: The Constitutional Limits on
Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996,46 CATH. U. L. REv. 907,939 (1997).
169 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15.
170 342 U.S. 437 (1952). The Perkins Court found that Ohio could properly assert general
jurisdiction over a Philippine mining corporation, based upon its unrelated but systematic and
continuous contacts with Ohio. The corporation's contacts with Ohio were the result of
Japanese occupation of the Philippines, which halted all mining operations, and forced the
president to return to his Ohio home. In Ohio, the president maintained an office from which he
carried on personal and corporate business, did banking for the corporation, and supervised
policies dealing with the rehabilitation of properties and dispatched funds. Id at 447-48.
171 466 U.S. 408 (1984). The case involved a wrongful death action brought in Texas state
court against a Colombian corporation. Id at 416-17.
172 In Helicopteros, the Colombian corporation's contacts with Texas consisted of a few
trips to Texas by corporate employees, and one trip by the corporation's chief executive officer
for the purpose of negotiating a contract, drawing checks from a Texas bank, and purchasing
helicopters. The Court found that these contacts were not systematic and continuous. Id at 418.
173 Sumner, supra note 168, at 940 n.128 (citing Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 1987)), and Debra Windsor, Comment, How
Speci fic Can We Make General Jurisdiction: The Search for a Refined Set of Standards, 44
BAYLOR L. REv. 593, 606-13 (1992) (examining federal court tests for general jurisdiction).
174 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998).
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United States citizen, it did not result in any direct contact with the United States.
Many cases arising under the 1996 Amendment will face the same problem.175
However, under the principle of general jurisdiction, the court could have haled
Iran into federal court if it found that Iran had systematic and continuous
diplomatic, economic, or political contacts with the United States such that
litigation in the United States was foreseeable.
Federal courts seeking to assert general jurisdiction in cases brought under
the 1996 Amendment face a difficult task because a sovereign designated as a
"state sponsor of terrorism" is often subject to economic sanctions and cold
diplomatic relations which result in very few international contacts. 176
Nevertheless, the Flatow opinion found that sovereign contacts were "sufficient
to sustain general jurisdiction over Defendants. ' 177 The court also found that
"[e]ven in the absence of diplomatic relations, state actors, as a matter of
necessity, have substantial sovereign contact with each other."178 There is
substantial evidence to support this argument. Not only do Iran and the United
States remain in constant contact through media and intelligence, but there have
been some direct communications. 17 9
Thus, many claims brought under the 1996 Amendment will require a finding
of general jurisdiction. The proper analysis--rendering a finding of general
jurisdiction more likely-will review the reasonableness of jurisdiction with
emphasis on fundamental social policies against terrorism and the extent of the
foreign state contacts on a national scale. Through this due process framework,
the legitimacy of the 1996 Amendment is preserved without undemining the
protections Congress intended to provide to United States citizens.
175 But see Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 54 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding the
defendant's terrorist acts bad a direct effect on the United States because it caused the United
States to deliver millions of dollars in humanitarian goods in return for hostages).
176 See id at 53-54. United States companies would like to pump oil in Iran again, but
United States economic sanctions against Iran prevent this from happening. Similarly, Iranians
yearn for business with the world's biggest economy, but continue to harbor anti-American
sentiments. Larry Kaplow, Iran Hostage Crisis Remembered: Countries Still Worlds Apart,
ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 31, 1999, at G2. Even reformist President Mohammad
Khatami, who has left the door open to better ties with Washington, recently said the United
States is "unjust" and remains separated from Iran by a "wall of mistrust." Kianouche Dorranie,
Iran for Detente but U.S., Israel Still Excluded, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Aug. 18, 1999, available
at LEXIS, News Library.
177 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 22.
178 I. at23.
179 President Clinton recently sent a letter to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami
asking cooperation in investigating the 1996 bombing of a U.S. military housing complex in
Saudi Arabia. US. AskedIran to Help Find Bombers, CI. TRB., Sept. 30, 1999 at 18.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The bomb that killed Alisa Flatow provokes anger within even the most
dovish American. Nevertheless, we should not let that bomb fall upon the
Constitution and its time honored principles. Congress created the 1996
Amendment to provide relief for the families of victims of terrorism. That noble
goal can be achieved without the Flatow result-foreign states should not be
stripped of due process rights.
The Supreme Court has found that the legal meaning of "person" can include
entities beyond human beings.1 80 The drafters of the FSIA and the earliest
versions of the 1996 Amendment, clearly believed that foreign states are
"persons" protected by due process requirements of minimum contacts. 1 81
Congress's assumptions are understandable given the long line of case law that
almost unanimously supports the principle that foreign states are persons for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 182
The Flatow ruling is also problematic from a foreign policy standpoint.183 If
foreign states are not entitled to due process rights, it might be easier for
politically motivated citizens to file harassment suits against a sovereign.
Furthermore, stripping foreign states of rights afforded to American citizens
discourages foreign participation in our judicial system and may incite reciprocal
treatment of the United States in foreign courts. All of these concerns can make
executive management of foreign diplomatic relations and negotiations very
difficult
Protecting foreign states with due process requirements of minimum contacts
does not spell the demise of the 1996 Amendment. Courts should review the
national contacts of each foreign state on a case by case basis, asserting general
jurisdiction where it can be found that national contacts are systematic and
continuous. 184 As always, the burden of the foreign defendant should be given
great weight, but this burden can be counterbalanced based on fundamental
substantive social policies against terrorism.185 Under this approach, the strength
of the Flatow claim is not weakened. Indeed, the legitimacy of the 1996
Amendment and the FSIA depends upon fair application of Constitutional
principles.
180 See supra Part V.A.
181 See supra Part IV.B.
182 See supra Part IV.C.
183 See supra Part IV.D.
184 See supra Part V.B-C.
185 See supra Part V.A.
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